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In all domains, from informal to formal, there are conflicts about property and ownership
which resolution demands consideration of alleged claims from more than one party.
In this work we asked adults (N = 359) to judge cases in which a character held
a property claim over an item, but is challenged by a second character who holds
a different, subsequent claim over it. The specific goal of this work is to investigate
how the resolution of such conflicts depends on the social endorsement of ownership
claims. To achieve this aim, we designed variations of conflictive situations over property
in which we manipulated details regarding the knowledge of the second agent of
other third-parties about the first agent’s actions. In essence, our questions were: if
an agent claims ownership of something which has a previous property claim on (1)
does it matter whether said agent knew of the first’s agent actions or not? And (2)
does it matter whether third parties were aware or notified of the first one’s claim? The
results confirm that adults resolve the settling of property rights based not only on the
nature of ownership claims but also on the social acknowledgment of such claims, in
accordance with what is stipulated in legal systems worldwide. Participants considered
the second character in the stories to hold a lesser right over the object under dispute
when she knew of the first character’s claim. Participants also considered that the first
character’s claim was reinforced when there were witnesses for her actions, but not
when third parties were merely communicated of such actions. This is the first study
to our knowledge that studies how social validation of ownership claims drives adults’
judgments on property claims.
Keywords: property, ownership, conflict resolution, legal thinking, intuitions
INTRODUCTION
The notion of property, and the rules that determine who owns what and why, are cornerstones
of every human society. Humans, as well as other animals, typically engage in possessive behaviors
(Brosnan, 2011; Rochat, 2014). Moreover, insofar as individuals aim at exclusive control over scarce
goods, other individuals are seen as competitors and as potential enemies to be excluded. And
yet, humans are also highly social beings who balance their aggressive and competitive tendencies
with other, equally powerful, cooperative inclinations (Tomasello, 2009). Indeed, property regimes
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rest on an underlying thread of cooperative behavior (Rose,
2007). The institution of ownership is only possible because
human agents abide by the rules in force and behave in
predictable ways. “Property, as an institution, requires stability in
people’s expectations about their own and other people’s claims”
(Rose, 2007, p. 1906). Understanding how we humans reason and
behave in this social-normative domain helps us to understand
how we are capable of thriving together in society. In this work,
we study the concept of ownership as a societal construct which
relies on and demands validation from the social environment.
Specifically, we look at how acknowledgment about other people’s
property claims affect the way we consider arguments over
ownership between third parties.
Usually, determining ownership involves a decision process
in which different arguments may be in conflict. Imagine that a
person collects some rare kind of wood in the forest and leaves it
near a road where someone else finds it and builds a chair with it.
Now the identity of the disputed item has changed (from wood
to a chair), but the discoverer of the wood still has a valid claim
over it. Who should keep the chair, the person who found the
wood or the person who built the chair? This concise narrative
confronts the principles of discovery and previous possession
with the principle of creation (and hence, of first possession of the
created item). Subjective arguments (for instance, the knowledge
of the intention a person has about something) can also come
into play in the judgment of ownership. For example, in the
previous story, one relevant issue may be whether the person who
built the chair knew that the wood was there because someone
else had just gathered it for using it in the future with another
purpose.
Such considerations involve a “mental” aspect, such as the
possible thoughts and knowledge of the character who creates
the chair in the example above – but also a “communicative”
aspect. Some legal theorists have in fact outlined the importance
of communication in the setting of property. For example,
Carol Rose explains that Common Law defines the act of
possession as “a kind of statement” and that the possessor’s
acts must be a declaration of her intent to appropriate (Rose,
1985). Similarly, in the 1931 Clipperton Island arbitration it
was stated that there “is no reason to suppose France has
subsequently lost her [title over the island] by derelictio [i.e.
abandonment], since she never had the animus of abandoning
[it], and the fact that she has not exercised her authority there in
a positive manner does not imply the forfeiture of an acquisition
already definitively protected” (Emmanuel, 1932, p. 394). Thus,
possession is “a kind of speech, with the audience composed
of all others who might be interested in claiming the object
in question”; possession as the basis of property amounts to
“yelling loudly enough to all who may be interested” (Rose,
1985, p. 79, p. 81). Rose’s point is that, for the law, physical
possession is not enough and appropriate communication is
necessary.
The motivation of this study can be seen as an effort
to inquire how these theories of property resonate with
folk intuitions, by asking participants to judge conflicts of
property in which the communication intention of one agent,
or the knowledge of previous possession of another agent
are manipulated. Specifically, we ask whether the following
possibilities hold in the intuitive reasoning of adult individuals:
(a) the consideration of claims, including history of possession,
determine the resolution of conflicts; (b) declarative speech
per se consolidates possession and protects ownership from a
second possessor’s claim; or (c) factual confirmation of possession
claims (either by the second possessor or by other social agents)
is necessary to warrant an original possession claim against
subsequent claims.
To achieve the goals of this work, we asked adult volunteers
to judge over concise situations in which an individual claims the
property of something which ownership has already been claimed
by a first agent. Our study required the presentation of conflicts
between two people who hold different and sequential claims over
a certain item, over which volunteers could judge. Using different
claims allowed us to test the extension of the studied effect under
different scenarios (also, the presentation of equal claims from
both characters could induce volunteers to consider that one of
them is lying). They also needed to be sequential in time to allow
for the inclusion of the factor of knowledge regarding a first
claimant.
The cases were based on three specific types of ownership
claims: discovery, creation, and adverse possession. These three
were selected because they represent claims of property which
are ubiquitous in legal systems worldwide. Discovery represents
an absolute case of first possession by finding something for the
first time. Creation combines first possession of the object created
(which did not exist before) with a possible previous history
of possession/ownership of the raw materials used. Adverse
possession, or occupation, as we will refer to it from now on,
necessarily implies the settling on a property which was occupied
or controlled by a previous owner. Such differences provide a
wide range of situations on which to study whether and how
the validation of property claims from a first actor either by the
second actor or by third-parties affects judgments in particular
arguments over property.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants in the study (N = 359) were recruited through our
laboratory’s social networks web pages. Volunteers participated
through anonymous online forms after completing an informed
consent about the objectives of the investigation in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. The study was approved
by the Ethical Committee for Research from the Center of
Medical Education and Clinical Research (CEMIC) “Norberto
Quirno” (Buenos Aires, Argentina). We report all measures and
manipulations. No individual subject data were excluded, as data
were only recorded if all necessary questions in forms were
completed.
Experimental Situations Design
Basic Conflicts Design
The combination of the three claims chosen for our study
produces three possible scenarios of conflict. The order in which
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the claims can appear in each situation cannot be arbitrary:
“discovery” involves first possession, while “occupation” can only
be performed by a second agent. Then, the three possible conflicts
are the following, which will be referred to as the fundamental
conflicts: (1) a discoverer of a raw material who is challenged by
a creator of a new item from said materials, (2) a discoverer of a
living territory who is challenged by second person who occupies
it, and (3) a creator of a living space who is challenged by another
person who occupies it. These three situations depict not only
different ownership claims, but also changes in the identity of
what is disputed: a manufactured item, a territory, and a habitable
construction. A basic set of situations was designed to present
the aforementioned conflicts. Characters were always defined as
X and Z, and in that order, for every story:
Discovery versus creation (D vs. C): “X discovers an amount of a
certain material. Z uses the material to manufacture something.”
Discovery versus occupation (D vs. O): “X discovers a livable place
(e.g., an island, a cave). Z occupies it actively for some time.”
Creation versus occupation (C vs. O): “Using freely available
materials, X builds a livable space. Z occupies it actively for some
time.”
From now on, we will refer to this set of situations as the basic
situations. The statements were conceived in the most concise
manner still able to unambiguously depict the characters’ claims.
For example, the occupier is said to occupy the place or the space
“actively for some time,” which distinguishes a circumstantial
occupation from a case of true adverse possession as understood
by common sense (and law). In the C vs. O conflict, the creator is
said to build the space from “freely available materials” to prevent
participant from potentially believing that the raw materials had
a previous owner (as in the D vs. C situation).
Variations from the Basic Situations
After the set of basic conflicts was determined, variations were
designed to tackle our study goal, which was to determine
whether resolution by participants depends on the consideration
of social validation of property claims. Accordingly, the variations
covered two possible details in the conflicts: (1) that the second
character was aware of the first character’s claim and (2) that third
parties had knowledge of the first character’s claim.
Second character’s knowledge
Binary variations of the basic situations were designed that stated
whether the second character knew about the first possessor’s
claim or not. This element will be referred to as the “knowledge”
factor, with binary variations having either negative or positive
“sign.” As an example, we transcribe here the variations for the
D vs. C conflict that describe whether the creator had previous
knowledge about the first character’s discovery:
No knowledge by the second character: “X discovers an amount of
a certain material. Z, without knowing about X’s discovery, uses the
material to manufacture something.”
Knowledge by the second character: “X discovers an amount of a
certain material. Z, knowing about X’s discovery, uses the material
to manufacture something.”
Third parties’ knowledge
Other persons may acquire knowledge about the actions of the
first character in two ways: either by being informed by her or by
witnessing her actions. Hence, both possibilities were evaluated
in our study and will be referred to as the “communication”
factor and the “witnesses” factor, respectively, with their binary
variations having positive or negative signs. Because detailing
whether third-parties knew about the claim of the first possessor
can drive participants to wonder whether the second character
shared such knowledge, it was made clear in the statements that
this was not the case. In this sense, variations for these two factors
are considered to be based on the “no knowledge by the second
character” case. The following examples illustrate the variations
corresponding to the D vs. C conflict:
No communication to third parties: “X discovers an amount of
a certain material. He does not communicate it to other people.
Z, without knowing about X’s discovery, uses the material to
manufacture something.”
Communication from the first character to third parties: “X
discovers an amount of a certain material, and he communicates
it to many people. Z, without knowing about X’s discovery, uses the
material to manufacture something.”
No witnesses for the first character’s actions: “X discovers an
amount of a certain material. There are no witnesses of his
discovery. Z, without knowing about X’s discovery, uses the material
to manufacture something.”
Presence of witnesses for the first character’s actions: “X discovers
an amount of a certain material, and many people witness his
discovery. Z, without knowing about X’s discovery, uses the material
to manufacture something.”
Summary of All Situations Tested in the Study
The study involved a total of 21 situations, summarized below:
- Three basic situations, one for each of the fundamental
conflicts.
- Six variations for the knowledge factor, with a pair of
negative/positive variations of the factor for each of the
fundamental conflicts.
- Six variations for the communication factor, with a pair of
negative/positive variations of the factor for each of the
fundamental conflicts.
- Six variations for the witnesses factor, with a pair of
negative/positive variations of the factor for each of the
fundamental conflicts.
Table 1 shows the total of volunteers who judged over each
situation in the study. The complete set of 21 statements in
the original form in Spanish and the corresponding translated
versions can be found in the Supplementary Material.
Questionnaires
After completing the informed consent and providing age and
gender data, each participant was faced with the following
instructions, after which they were presented with the first case
in a separate page:
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Resolution of conflicts: Through the following pages, we will present
you with different situations involving two characters, X and Z.
Read each of the situations attentively. Some of them might seem
similar to the others, but they may present subtle differences. We
ask you to consider each of the presented situations as isolated and
independent from the previous ones. Answer to the questions you
are presented with according to your judgment.
Case 1. Analyze the following situation:
‘X discovers an amount of a certain material. Z uses the material to
manufacture something.’
Whose manufactured object (space, or place, depending on the
conflict) is it?
Answer exclusively according to your judgment. You have to decide
in favor of one of the two characters, so take your time.
The participant was allowed to choose either X or Z. After
deciding, they were presented with the following case. Three
situations were presented to each volunteer. No answers were
recorded unless all three activities were completed and submitted.
We divided the volunteers into two experiments. Experiment I
was designed to probe the intuitions of our population regarding
the fundamental conflicts that we conceived. Volunteers (n= 55,
mean age ± SD = 35.3 ± 12.8, females = 61%) received each of
the three basic situations in a random order.
In Experiment II, volunteers (n = 304; mean
age ± SD = 32.9 ± 11.7, females = 60%) judged over a set
of three variations from the basic situations. Each participant
judged over three cases, one corresponding to each of the
fundamental conflicts, and each one of these displaying a
variation on a different factor (“knowledge,” “communication,” or
“witnesses”), in a random order and combination. For example,
a given participant would get a combination like the following:
(1) D vs. C: “no knowledge by the second character”; (2) C vs. O:
“communication from the first character to third parties”; and (3)
D vs. O: “presence of witnesses for the first character’s actions.”
The reason for dividing the study into two experiments,
one focusing on the basic statements and the other on the
variations, was that if a participant received one of the variations
of the studied factors of a conflict, and considered such
information for her judgment, such consideration might be
“carried over” to a following basic situation devoid of details
on such factor. The difference in the number of participants
between the two experimental populations derives from the total
of statements tested in each experiment: every participant in the
first experiment received every basic situation, while a participant
in the second experiment received only 3 out of the 18 different
situations in the set (three fundamental conflicts, times three
factors, times two variations for each factor). This design allowed
us to have 51± 7 answers/judgments for each situation tested.
Data Analysis
Analysis of the distribution of binary judgments in each group
was performed as follows. First, according to the experiment,
a general linear model (GLM) or a general linear mixed model
(GLMM) was fitted to the responses data, including all potential
factors influencing judgments: age, gender, order of presentation
of the stories through the questionnaire, the fundamental conflict
involved, and the type and sign of variation (these two only for
Experiment II). Then, factor-null models were fitted in which
each of these factors was individually removed from the original
model. Finally, each of these null models was compared to the
original model through likelihood ratio tests (LRT). The results
of the LRT are reported as the effects of each individual factor on
judgments.
Fit of GLM, GLMMs, and LRT was performed in R (R
Development Core Team, 2011). Mixed models were performed
with the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015).
RESULTS
First, let’s remember our three model situations on which
participants judged. In the D vs. C story, a discoverer of raw
material is challenged by a creator of a new item from said
materials. In the D vs. O story, a discoverer of a living territory
is challenged by second character who occupies it. Finally, in the
C vs. O story, a creator of a living space is challenged by another
character who occupies it.
Intuitions on the Basic Situations
In Experiment I, we tested the judgments of participants to
the three fundamental conflicts. The objective was to define
TABLE 1 | Summary of participants’ judgments for every situation in the study.
“Knowledge” factor “Communication” factor “Witnesses” factor
Conflict Basic situations (−) (+) (−) (+) (−) (+)
D vs. C 55
7/48
54
9/91
53
28/72∗
45
0/100
51
8/92
45
2/98
56
25/75∗∗
D vs. O 55
25/30
59
24/76
58
69/31∗∗∗
45
20/80
51
29/71
45
18/82
46
46/54∗
C vs. O 55
47/8
48
87/13
52
100/0∗
45
82/18
56
89/11
45
89/11
58
88/12
The total answers to each of the situations tested in the study are presented in bold. The pair of values below each of these totals represent the percentages of judgments
favoring the first character/the second character for each situation. Asterisks indicate pairs of variations for a determined factor and conflict that showed significant
differences after two-tailed Chi-square tests (full statistical details presented in the Supplementary Material). The signs “−” and “+” indicate the “sign” of each of the
variations. Supplementary Table 1 presents the actual number of judgments favoring each character for each of the situations in the study. Bonferroni corrected p-values:
∗p < 0.016, ∗∗p < 0.0033, ∗∗∗p < 0.00033.
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our population basic intuitions regarding the situations that we
would further work on Experiment II.
Judgments of the three main dilemmas in Experiment
I showed that creators received significantly more favorable
decisions (meaning they were more likely to be judged as the
owners of the disputed property) than discoverers (87% in favor
of the creator; binomial test: p < 0.001, RR = 1.745) and
occupiers (85% in favor of the creator; p < 0.001, RR = 1.709).
By contrast, the D vs. O conflict did not show a significant
preference in favor of either of the two agents (45% vs. 55%
for the discoverer and the occupier, respectively; Table 1 and
Supplementary Table 2).
We fitted all participants’ answers to a GLMM including
age, gender, order of presentation of the stories, and finally, the
identity of the specific conflict evaluated. The GLMM fit followed
by LRT comparing “null models” for each factor revealed
that both the fundamental conflict involved (X2(3) = 69.084,
p < 0.001) and age (X2(1) = 6.961, p = 0.008) were significant
determinants of judgments. On the other hand, neither gender
(X2(1) = 2.268, p = 0.132) nor of order of presentation
(X2(1) = 0.215, p = 0.642) had any effects on the outcome of
decisions.
The three fundamental conflicts, then, represent very different
scenarios on which to test the hypothesis of Experiment II: one
clearly determined in favor of the first agent in the sequence (the
creator over the occupier), one in favor of the second agent (again
the creator, over the discoverer), and one with no population
consensus on its resolution (the discoverer vs. the occupier).
Second Agent’s Knowledge of the First
Agent’s Claim
The first question in Experiment II was whether the fact that the
second agent in the stories knew or not about the first agent’s
claim for ownership was a determinant of volunteer’s resolution
of the conflicts.
The results showed that information about the knowledge
of the second character concerning the first character’s actions
had a strong effect on judgments (Figure 1). Judgments favoring
the first character increased nearly threefold in the D vs. C
(from 9% to 28% in favor of the discoverer) and the D vs.
O cases (from 24% to 69% in favor of the discoverer), and
over 10% in the C vs. O case (from 87% to 100% in favor of
the creator), for the statements that reported that the second
character knew of the first character’s claim in comparison to
the ones stating that the second character was not aware of it
(Table 1).
We fitted a GLM to the volunteers’ answers including age,
gender, order of presentation of the stories, the particular
fundamental conflict involved, and whether the second character
in the stories knew about the first’s claim. We added an
interaction term to the model considering that the “knowledge”
factor could have different effects according to the fundamental
conflict considered. The GLM-LRT analysis confirmed a
significant effect of the “knowledge” factor (X2(3) = 41.49,
p < 0.001) and no interaction with the fundamental conflicts
(X2(2) = 2.910, p = 0.233). Neither age (X2(1) = 0.034,
p = 0.855), nor gender (X2(1) = 0.012, p = 0.913), nor order of
FIGURE 1 | Proportion of judgments favoring the first character when
considering the “knowledge” factor: whether the second character was aware
of the first possessor’s claim or not. The intermediate blank bars are included
as means of illustration of the judgments in the basic situations on which each
variation is based. GLM-LRT analysis revealed a significant effect of the
“knowledge” factor (X2(3) = 41.49, p < 0.001). Asterisks indicate significant
differences between variations from Chi-square tests (Supplementary Table 3).
Bonferroni corrected p-values: ∗p < 0.016, ∗∗∗p < 0.00033.
presentation (X2(1)= 1.429, p= 0.232) had significant effects on
decisions.
In short, these results show that in everyday intuitions people
judge that if a person acts on stuff and claims property of it based
on her actions, her rights to own the stuff are diminished when
she was aware that there was a previous agent claiming ownership
over it. Instead, if she was ignorant of the first agent’s actions, her
claim over the stuff holds a stronger value.
Third-Parties’ Knowledge of the First
Agent’s Actions
The second question Experiment II wanted to answer was
whether knowledge from third parties about the claim of a first
agent would modify volunteers’ decisions regarding ownership
challenges from a second agent.
Information on whether the first character in the stories had
communicated her claim to others or not had no effect on
participants judgments (Figure 2A and Table 1). A GLM fit
identical to the described in the above subsection, followed by
LRT comparisons, reported no effect of the “communication”
factor (X2(3) = 6.890, p = 0.075), and no interaction according
to fundamental conflicts (X2(2) = 3.091, p = 0.213). We found a
significant effect of age (X2(1) = 6.843, p = 0.009), but none of
gender (X2(1)= 1.342, p= 0.247) nor of order of presentation of
the stories (X2(1)= 0.223, p= 0.637).
The presence or absence of witnesses for the actions of the
first character, on the other hand, was a major determinant of
judgments (Figure 2B and Table 1). Situations stating that the
first character’s claim was witnessed by many people significantly
increased judgments in her favor in the D vs. C (from 2%
to 25% in favor of the discoverer) and the D vs. O conflicts
(from 18% to 46% in favor of the discoverer). No significative
effect was found in the C vs. O conflict, which already showed
a high proportion of decisions favoring the creator from the
basic situation. A GLM-LRT analysis reported a significant effect
of the “witnesses” factor (X2(3) = 22.229, p < 0.001), and a
significant interaction with the fundamental conflict involved
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FIGURE 2 | Proportion of judgments favoring the first character when considering (A) the “communication” factor: whether the first character communicated her
actions to third-parties or not; and (B) the “witnesses” factor: whether third-parties witnessed the first character’s actions or not. The intermediate blank bars are
included as means of illustration of the judgments in the “no knowledge by the second character” situation on which each variation is based (see section “Materials
and Methods”). GLM-LRT analyses for each factor revealed significant effects of the “witnesses” factor (X2(3) = 22.229, p < 0.001), but none of the
“communication” factor (X2(3) = 6.890, p = 0.075). Asterisks indicate significant differences between variations from Chi-square tests (Supplementary Tables 4, 5).
Bonferroni corrected p-values: ∗p < 0.016, ∗∗p < 0.0033.
(X2(2) = 7.464, p = 0.024). Neither age (X2(1) = 1.600,
p = 0.206), nor gender (X2(1) = 3.058, p = 0.080), nor order of
presentation (X2(1)= 0.014, p= 0.906) had significant effects on
decisions.
Altogether, these results indicate that validation from third
parties can reinforce the first agents’ claims or, inversely, weaken
the second agents’ challenges, but only when this validation is
achieved by factual confirmation. While merely communicating
her claim to third parties did not make the first agent’s position
any stronger, counting on witnesses for her actions provided her
claims with a better protection from subsequent challenges.
DISCUSSION
In the present study we show that basic intuitions on the
resolution of ownership conflicts can be biased according to
social and “institutional” considerations that go beyond the
analysis of individual claims. In short, we have found that an
agent’s previous knowledge about the history of ownership of
a given item weakens his subsequent claim over it, even if her
actions present a strong case for ownership. Also, the validation
by witnesses of an agent’s claim over something provides
defense against a second agent’s dispute of such ownership.
Such protection, however, cannot be achieved by the mere
communication of property claims to third parties.
Ownership rights can be acquired either ex novo or, most
commonly, through transference from a previous owner. People
recognize many valid ways in which transference of property
can be achieved, as well as many others which are unacceptable
or illegal (but which may result in transference of ownership
anyway). Frequently, ownership rights are contested, thus
creating a conflict and requiring a resolution that is not self-
evident from the start. When the veracity and legitimacy of
the agents making opposing ownership claims is undisputed, an
unambiguous solution must be carefully constructed.
Neither actual nor previous possession can be used as the
ultimate criteria for deciding ownership in a conflict of parties.
One key question then is “who has a better right?” Is it the
case that we all observe an ideal hierarchy of principles that
inform us on how to adjudicate ownership? The resolution of
such conflicts has been studied from different angles in the
literature. Kanngiesser et al. (2010) showed that both adults and
children approved ownership transfers of clay figures modeled
by one person, after another person had worked on them so
as to create a new shape, thus indicating that creation may
trump first possession (of the clay). Friedman (2010) proved
that people value the intention to possess something (viewed as
the effort invested in such task) over physical possession per se
(Palamar et al., 2012). Rochat et al. (2014) studied the answers
of children to ownership dilemmas, and found that they favor
first possession in most cases. Shotland and Hyers (2000) have
shown that Common Law regarding adverse possession seems
to be based on current social considerations, while DeScioli and
Karpoff (2015), on the other hand, have found that people often
do not consider property conflicts in line with the law’s reasoning.
In brief, there are evidences that ownership rights are judged
according to principles that include both first possession and
the merit of the parties involved. Our first experimental group
who judged over the basic situations, for example, reflected the
prevalence of “creation” as a strong claim for ownership.
But property is also a social and institutional act, in the sense
of Searle (1995). As we hinted in the section “Introduction,”
ownership is a construct which demands not only relevant actions
to acquire such property, but also to be backed and validated by
agents from the social environment. The objective of this study
was to determine if this also holds true for participants’ judgments
to ownership conflicts.
In the first place, we found that people consider transgression
of property claims less offensive when the transgressor is unaware
of the actions of the original claimant/owner. The second
claimant’s knowledge of the original possessor was a major
determinant of judgments in the all situations tested. A simple
explanation may be that people see the informed second character
as someone who willfully and unrightfully seeks to take property
from the first character. People seem to consider that it is
not acceptable to intentionally and consciously transgress others’
ownership rights. For example, Millar et al. (2014) have shown
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that adults would accept to sacrifice their own property, but
not another person’s, in order to save a third’s more valuable
stuff, considering the respect of thirds’ property over utilitarian
implications. This is consistent with real-world situations in the
fact that, in some jurisdictions, authorities have rejected claims
to adverse possession when they originated from intentional
trespass (Austin, 2014). It is interesting nevertheless that 65% of
participants in our experiment considered that it was OK for the
creator character to take ownership of the raw materials from the
discoverer (and own the created object), even when she knew that
someone held a claim over it. This reinforces the idea that some
claims are not considered as strong as others for establishing
property rights.
Establishing ownership also requires that certain social norms
are met to allow validation of property rights from other
agents, which in turn prevents both willful and unintentional
transgressions of such rights, and hence maintains social peace
and reduces unnecessary conflicts (Rose, 1985). The best method
to achieve this is to make ownership known to others by
appropriate means, and in this sense publicizing one’s property
claim may be seen as attempting to make explicit the intention to
own and control (Fuller, 1969).
Officialization of established property is a basic legal
requirement in every society ruled by law (Rose, 1985). This
is only logical. In the words of Austin, if what the concept
of “ownership involves is the idea that third parties have
obligations in relation to the owner . . . then publicity would
demand that these third parties know that something is owned
rather than unowned” (Austin, 2014, p. 93). Publicity, therefore,
is essential for ownership claims being respected by others.
Our study demonstrated that counting on witnesses for the
actions of the first character reinforces her claims, but that
simple communication of such acts is not as relevant. These
results suggest that ownership claims demand a specific level
of acknowledgment from the public to be validated and hence
receive support against potential future claimants. We cannot
discard the possibility that these and other forms of social
validation interact to some degree with the previously discussed
“knowledge” factor: participants may assess the assertion that the
second character is unaware of the original agent’s claim as being
more or less likely to be true according to the specific method
of validation. Although we cannot control such assumptions
from participants, the statement in the “communication” and
“witnesses” variations that the second character did not know
about the history of the disputed object leads us to assume that
such an interaction would, in average, be filtered out.
The present work opens additional questions toward a deeper
understanding of human intuitions on property. An interesting
subject to address regards the ethical considerations that are
involved in the establishment of property (for a comprehensive
summary of the philosophical analysis of ownership, see
Waldron, 2016). In his First Treatise on Government, Locke
(1988) proposed that individuals gain private ownership by
mixing his labor with nature. On the other hand, whenever
someone makes something new available to society, or idle
resources are put to work, a utilitarian consideration may also
demand property rights. Finally, social or individual needs may
lead to the assignment of property for the sake of increasing
fairness (Rawls, 1999). In essence, these considerations are
intrinsic to the concept of property as it is understood by both
Common and International Law. The three traditional claims
for ownership that are used in the study differ significantly in
such moral meanings. Discovery implies that new, presumably
valuable stuff is made available, and therefore it increases the
total net value of society in utilitarian terms. Occupation may
be seen as reflecting the individual’s need or a social necessity
to put to work otherwise idle resources, and may thus promote
equality. Creation demands investment of physical and creative
labor, and it represents individualistic, Lockean values at their
best. These differences added another layer of complexity to our
set of conflicts, thus increasing the range of situations on which
to test the factors in our study. However, this also means that
it is impossible to disentangle the potential weights of each of
such ethical considerations in our volunteers’ judgments – but, as
stated above, these are nevertheless fundamental to the nature of
ownership. Further studies should be carried out to measure the
relative weights of such considerations in the settling of property
in similar conflicts between parties.
We believe this study provides novel elements to consider in
the study of ownership notions and reasoning. To our knowledge,
this is the first work studying these features in the resolution of
property dilemmas. Further studies should determine whether
these normative considerations are already present in children,
which have been shown to resolve conflicts following strategies
that are not always identical to those of adults. Further work
in this area of common sense notions about property, on
how we come to own things and interchange them, and on
how ownership rights can be obtained and contested will help
us understand our social behavior and the evolution of ever
changing social norms and law. In words of Friedrich Hayek:
While property is initially a product of custom, and jurisdiction
and legislation have merely developed it in the course of millennia,
there is then no reason to suppose that the particular forms it
has assumed in the contemporary world are final. Traditional
concepts of property rights have in recent times been recognized
as a modifiable and very complex bundle whose most effective
combinations have not yet been discovered in all areas (Hayek,
1988, p. 36).
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